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JAMES KEYTE:  Fred, we are in a Fireside 
Chat now, with people out on the floor in the 
ballroom.   
I do think it is an amazing thing we can do, 
and it’s very cool, and we will certainly work in the 
future on making it easier for people to access and 
also run their mics and cameras when they access.  
It’s just part of what we are going to have to go 
through as we get used to this kind of technology and 
use it even when we are in a world where it is not 
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forced upon us. 
Many people out there obviously know who you 
are and what you have been doing, but for those who do 
not, let me start with an introduction. 
Fred Jenny is Professor of Economics at 
ESSEC Business School in Paris.  Since 1994 he has 
been the Chairman of the OECD’s Competition Committee.  
He is Co-Director of the European Center for Law and 
Economics.  He was a judge on the French Supreme Court 
— I assume probably the only economist on that court.  
He was a Vice Chair of the French Competition 
Authority.  He has a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard 
and a Doctorate in Economics from the University of 
Paris.  The list could go on.  I don’t know if I have 
missed any of the major highlights. 
He is just an incredible figure, always 
active in the antitrust academic community.  The 
pieces coming out of the OECD are incredibly thorough 
and balanced. 
What I want you to do first, Fred, is just 
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explain to people what the OECD does in the 
competition space, your role in it, and what you are 
up to even now in that space. 
FREDERIC JENNY:  First of all, thank you 
very much for having invited me to this Fireside Chat. 
The OECD — it’s interesting that you asked 
this question.  A few years ago I was asked that 
question by a visiting delegation from the U.S. Senate 
— I think it was the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee — and they sat in front of me and asked, 
“Why should the United States support a United Nations 
organization?”  I told them, “OECD is not a United 
Nations organization.” 
JAMES KEYTE:  I know that much. 
FREDERIC JENNY:  The OECD is a gathering of 
thirty-six countries now, and more  countries are 
becoming members.  In the Competition Committee, in 
addition to the delegates of the member states, we 
have fifteen observers, so we are talking about fifty-
three country delegations really. 
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The OECD is divided into various 
directorates and committees.  One of the aspects of 
the OECD which is particularly important is that it 
covers the whole spectrum of economic policies.  One 
is competition; taxation, anti-corruption, trade, 
consumer protection, investment etc., etc. What this 
means is that the institution is designed to promote 
policy coherence and to explore complementarities 
among economic policies. So we look at issues such as 
trade and competition or competition and employment or 
growth and competition etc… with our colleagues in 
other Committees as well as at pure competition 
issues. 
About fifty-four delegations come to Competition 
Committee meetings. In most cases, these days, the 
delegates  are heads or high officials  of the 
competition authorities of the Member countries. When 
I was first elected Committee Chair, the members of 
the Committee were for the most part officials from 
ministries . But since then Competition authorities in 
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numerous jurisdictions have become independent.  
In the context of OECD our committee is free 
to decide what we want to focus on. 
The way we work is quite different from that 
of the International Competition Network.   
First, we have a very able secretariat team 
of lawyers and economists.  Among other things, when 
we take up a topic the secretariat prepares background 
notes. Background notes are tremendously useful 
because, for each topic, they explain the underlying 
issues, the jurisprudence in various countries and the 
challenges for the future. 
 Second, when we have a roundtable on a 
topic, we invite experts, who are often academics, but 
may also be judges or business people or specialists 
of other fields, to come and dialogue with us. This 
dialogue is generally very open and enlightening. The 
experts may express their opinions on this or that 
decision by a competition authority or judgment by a 
court. This type of discussion brings out what these 
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experts see as a possible criticism or what they see 
as the strong points of what we do. They also help us 
think about new challenges facing competition 
authorities. 
Third,  the delegates of the Competition 
Committee  present a large number of contributions in 
which they express their approaches, describe their 
cases and discuss the relevance of various issues and 
I cannot thank them enough for that. 
The roundtables are extremely valuable not 
only for the competition authorities themselves but 
for the legal and economic community as well.  
They allow us to explore difficult or new 
topics in competition law enforcement.  For example, 
we have had more than ten different panels related to 
the challenges of competition law enforcement in the 
digital sector — on artificial intelligence, on 
blockchains, platforms and multisided markets  etc… 
These exchanges allow competition authorities to learn 
from one another as well as to learn from the best 
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experts in the world.  
 A related facet of our work is the 
production of recommended good practices. Those 
recommendations are proposed by the committee by 
consensus and endorsed by the Council of the OECD. 
They carry a certain amount of weight because by the 
time they are adopted by the OECD Council they have 
already become governmental recommendations adopted on 
the basis of the work that the Committee has done in 
various sectors. It has produced recommendations on 
the fight against cartels, on international 
cooperation, on structural separation in network 
industries etc….  
The Committee meets twice a year, and there 
is a third session with competition authorities from 
non-OECD member countries, called the OECD Global 
Forum on Competition, which is held back to back with 
one of the two Committee sessions.  At each Global 
Forum usually around 110  competition authorities are 
represented together with a number of international 
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organizations such as the WTO, the World Bank etc….  
For the discussions  during this Global Forum, we 
choose topics which are of interest both to the 
developed country members of OECD and  to less-
developed countries. 
 
We also have three regional centers — one in 
Latin America, one in Hungary for Eastern Europe, and 
one in Korea for Asia — and  organize many teaching 
and programs for judges and competition officials in 
those regional centers. 
JAMES KEYTE:  That’s perfect, Fred. 
Is the output of the OECD’s Competition 
Committee easily available to the public?  Is it a 
Google search away or is there some way to access it? 
FREDERIC JENNY:  One of the characteristics 
of the OECD Competition Committee is transparency. 
Everything,meaning all the written contributions of 
delegates, the background note of the secretariat, the 
papers of the experts and the summary of the 
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discussion is on the OECD competition web site.   
To be honest, when I became chairman of the 
Committee, I had been a delegate for a few years and I 
had seen the pain of negotiating long reports. Even 
though there were fewer OECD members at the time, a 
lot of time was wasted in trying to find common 
language on issues where competition authorities had 
differences. We decided to do away with this and  to 
publish everything that is produced.  All of this is 
available on the OECD Competition website. 
What we have published in the past  and what 
we continue publishing is an extremely useful source 
of information for the competition community.  We have 
been doing this for twenty-five years, so there are a 
great many topics that have been selected by the 
members. Going to the OECD competition website is a 
great source to find out, about nearly every topic, 
what are the issues and what are the cases that have 
been dealt with by various competition authorities on 
this particular topic. 
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JAMES KEYTE:  I didn’t even know about the 
background notes.  So if you want to dive deep into 
different positions that were put forward by different 
constituents —— 
FREDERIC JENNY:   The OECD Competition 
website is used by a large number of competition 
specialists.  It is used by lawyers in many countries, 
but it is also used by judges and competition 
officials.  Very often, when competition officials or 
judges or lawyers have a case, the first thing they do 
once they have identified the issue is to go to the 
OECD site to see whether we have background notes and 
contributions on the topic, to quickly learn about 
similar cases, what decisions were made, and what the 
issues are. 
JAMES KEYTE:  When you are on a topic — 
let’s say the digital economy — certainly many years 
ago that was on the horizon; you probably started 
talking about it; maybe you had a report.  Do you have 
some reports that kind of take a historical 
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retrospective on a topic?  Is the general approach 
that when you are now doing a report on Big Tech you 
are going to incorporate learning from all those past 
reports as well? 
FREDERIC JENNY:  Yes, we do.  I would say 
that about every ten years we go back to the same 
topic.  We do not want to do it too often, because 
that would be a bit boring, but after eight to ten 
years we go back to the same topic and build on 
previous contributions, background notes and experts’ 
papers. 
JAMES KEYTE:  It is interesting that part of 
the scope includes, in a sense, non-pure competition 
issues.   
Last year, I think there was a lot of 
discussion about industrial policy in Europe in the 
Member States, in particular about creating national 
champions, wanting perhaps even to modify or have some 
kind of — I don’t know if you want to call them veto 
rights, but certainly a way to trump a competition 
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decision based on national champions. 
Did the OECD take that subject up? 
FREDERIC JENNY:  Of course we try to 
anticipate what the important issues are going to be. 
In recent years, we had a close look at the 
interaction between competition and industrial policy 
and a discussion about the institutional design of 
competition authorities. 
JAMES KEYTE:  What was the outcome of that?  
That is a very politically charged topic. 
FREDERIC JENNY:  
The relationship between industrial policy 
and competition policy has been a topic which was 
discussed in the Global Forum, so the forum in which 
we looked at this issue was even larger than the OECD 
Committee. The reason is that the relationship between 
these two policies is an issue worldwide. 
One clear lesson is that an enlightened 
competition policy and strong law enforcement are 
necessary conditions for achieving efficiency and for 
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the promotion of consumer welfare but they may not be 
sufficient to deal with some market failures and to 
promote economic growth. So there is a legitimate 
economic role for industrial policy. There may also be 
socio-political reasons why governments may want to 
intervene in markets mechanisms. And there may be 
cases where industrial policy measures are designed to 
restrict competition because governments have 
willingly or unwillingly been captured by special 
interest groups. Altogether, industrial policy is a 
bit like cholesterol. There is good cholesterol and 
there is bad cholesterol. 
I think  that what the competition community 
has not done  and what it should do  is to spend some 
time thinking about  what a procompetitive industrial 
policy would look like and to promote this type of 
industrial policy as a useful complement to 
competition policy.    
That is too bad, because in fact when you 
study industrial policy in details, you find that in 
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some countries,  the United States for example,  some 
industrial policy programs conceived by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects  Agency (DARPA) succeeded 
in achieving technological advances, maintaining 
competition among lines of research, engaging the 
business community, facilitating the dialogue between 
researchers, and weeding out the failing projects from 
the successful ones.  
This approach, which combines industrial 
policy and competition, is quite different from the 
type of industrial policy that used to exist in 
Europe, where a national champion was chosen and 
entrusted with the task of developing a new 
technology. 
I think that there would be a lot of value 
in trying to, first of all, show that industrial 
policy is a natural complement to competition policy 
and not in opposition to competition policy; and 
second, that there are procedures that allow countries 
to have an active industrial policy while at the same 
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time respecting competition. 
JAMES KEYTE:  Yes.  And really the great 
thing about the transparency at the OECD is if someone 
put forth that position paper, you would have all the 
notes debating that and all the contrary positions.  I 
look forward to that. 
Let me move to what’s very current now in 
this part of our conference and ask if you think that 
the antitrust principles and analytical frameworks 
currently being used in Europe and elsewhere can 
accommodate the digital economy and the rapid changes 
even within the digital economy.  Do we need something 
else or can we do it with what we have? 
FREDERIC JENNY:  That’s a pretty broad 
question. 
JAMES KEYTE:  It is.  Barry Hawk would go 
for hours I suspect. 
FREDERIC JENNY:  Do I have three hours to 
answer that question? [Laughter] 
I think that there are different issues. 
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First, there is the question of whether  
competition authorities are able to identify 
anticompetitive situations in the digital sector. 
Second, there is the question of: If we find 
them, should they be sanctioned in the same way as 
similar practices in the non digital world?   
To be honest, on this second issue my answer 
is yes. 
The most troubling question is:  How 
difficult is it for competition authorities to 
identify anticompetitive practices or transactions in 
a digital economy?  To try to answer this question, I 
think one needs to differentiate between information 
technology and communication technology. 
The technological developments in 
communication technology have basically allowed us to 
overcome distances, to make communication easier, to 
facilitate matching, and, in fact, to encourage the 
division of labor.  Roughly speaking, those 
technological developments are procompetitive.   
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Competition authorities have, of course, had  
many difficulties applying their traditional tools to 
communication markets because those markets have 
different features from traditional one sided markets. 
They are much more difficult to define, not only 
because they can be multisided, but also because a 
communication technology firm is not really associated 
with one particular industry or one particular market.  
It can diversify and it can benefit from scope 
economies as well as scale economies, so therefore it 
can move from sector to sector.   
While I was a non executive board member of the OFT 
(from 2007 to 2014) there was a review of the 
Facebook/Instagram merger in 2012.  I remember  that 
we felt that the evidence before the OFT did not show 
that Instagram would be particularly well placed to 
compete against Facebook. Furthermore, there were  
many other likely candidates to compete with Facebook. 
So the OFT concluded that the merger did not raise a  
competition issue.  Yet, in less than two years 
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Instagram had become a social media competing with 
Facebook. This is to show that it can be difficult to 
identify a potential competition issue. 
Identifying markets is one challenge. 
Identifying a business model for platforms is another 
one.  Understanding how competition among ecosystems 
works, as opposed to competition among firms, has been 
quite challenging.  Those are some of the difficulties 
that we have  faced in this particular area. 
Now if we go to information technology, I 
think that the issues are a bit different.  
First of all, information technology has 
been dominated by the emergence of artificial 
intelligence and machine learning algorithms.  Those 
developments have had a number of consequences. 
One of them is to create a link between the 
consumers and suppliers because the information that 
the consumers  provide during their consumption 
becomes an input into the production process of 
suppliers, so there is a loop there that does not 
 19 
 
 
 
 
exist, at least not with  comparable importance, in 
the non digital world. 
The second consequence has to do with the 
fact that  because of the way artificial intelligence 
has been developed means that there actually is an 
impetus towards concentration because when algorithms 
are trained the more data they are fed, the better 
they get at predicting or finding regularities.  This 
means that the firm that has more data, everything 
else being equal, has an advantage over its 
competitors.  Thus there is a natural tendency toward 
the concentration of data gathering,  as well as a 
concentration of firms which use those algorithms. 
So developments in information technology 
have really been a force against competition rather 
than a force moving in the direction of competition. 
We have been struggling with this because 
the catch is that as data gets concentrated and as 
concentration of firms on the market increases,  the 
quality of the digital services they offer improves, 
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so it is very hard to separate the anticompetitive 
part of the mechanism from the pro-efficiency part of 
it. 
JAMES KEYTE:  Let me stop you there.  
Executive Vice President Vestager used the phrase 
several times “contestable markets” and wanting to 
make markets more contestable. 
From the U.S. perspective, markets are what 
they are and you are either engaging in misconduct or 
you are not, whether or not your market is contestable 
or not.  Obviously, that goes to entry barriers and 
market structure and concentration and durability of 
market power. 
But it seemed that what I was hearing is 
that there is a policy of wanting to make markets more 
contestable.  It goes right to your issue of there are 
positive network effects and scale and scope in this 
kind of space that are good for consumers but yet 
might make the market less contestable.  How do you 
balance that?  That is a tough question. 
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FREDERIC JENNY:  That is a very tough 
question, and that is a question that can lead to very 
different answers from one country to another. 
You know that in Europe we have a particular 
concern with dominant firms and a particular focus on 
market structure.  There are many historical reasons 
for this which I do not have time to go into but one 
of the most obvious is that many dominant firms in 
Europe did not become dominant because they were 
efficient but because they enjoyed some kind of  
protection from competition. Thus there is no 
particular reason to have a favorable a priori with 
respect to dominant firms. This explains why Europeans 
have the notion that dominant firms should have a 
special responsibility to ensure that they do not 
restrict competition. 
This starting point is quite different from 
the general assumption underlying  U.S. antitrust law 
that market power is usually the sign of superior 
economic performance and that it is only if it is 
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demonstrated that firms with market power have abused 
their position that they should be sanctioned. 
Thus in Europe, the tolerance for aggressive 
strategies by dominant firms is much lower than the 
tolerance in the US for aggressive strategies by firms 
with market power. In the US such aggressive tactics 
will be considered normal in most cases and only 
reprehensible if they are shown to eliminate efficient 
competition on the market. In Europe they will be 
considered violations of competition law if they are 
likely to alter the structure of the market and to 
make life “ unnecessarily” difficult for their current 
or potential competitors. 
This difference between approaches in Europe 
and the US, combined with the fact that European 
competition law enforcers and courts are more 
concerned with type II errors and the US with type I 
errors, is not specific to the digital economy, but is 
of course applicable to the digital sector.  Hence, I 
think this explains partly what Mrs. Vestager was 
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saying. 
Now, I have not yet read the House report. 
JAMES KEYTE:  I haven’t either.  I will. 
FREDERIC JENNY:  And I will.   
But I hear that there is some European 
inspiration  in views sometimes expressed in the US 
that concentration is bad in itself irrespective of 
whether or not it leads to improved services. 
JAMES KETE:  Yes.  I had a question in one 
of our instant surveys:  “Are you in the Schumpeter 
camp, the Arrow camp, or ‘I don’t know what you’re 
talking about?’”  There was a lot of “I don’t know 
what you’re talking about.” 
This battle between what is good for 
innovation and consumers — is it concentration through 
innovation with positive network effects, or is it 
better to structure the marketplace so that you have 
more people trying to innovate but you structure it 
through antitrust enforcement or regulation — I think 
is the critical debate. 
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I hear that the House report indicates that 
“Well, if you don’t do it in the courts, we are going 
to do it through legislation.” 
Part of the question is: Does that in some 
sense avoid the difficult question of balancing 
something that inspires innovation and is good for 
consumers but could have effects on deterring entry 
and innovation from smaller rivals? 
What is your view on whether this should be 
played out through enforcers or in the marketplace 
versus “Let’s just stop and legislate this kind of 
situation?” 
FREDERIC JENNY:  That is another tough 
question which will take quite a while to answer. 
JAMES KEYTE:  It’s a Fireside Chat question. 
FREDERIC JENNY:  There are again several 
considerations to keep in mind to answer your 
question. 
First of all, I think that one has to 
distinguish between various options.   
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One option is to propose a specific sectoral 
regulation for the digital economy with one or a set 
of regulators.  
JAMES KEYTE:  Right. 
FREDERIC JENNY:   
In Europe  a second  regulatory option is considered. 
The idea is that competition authorities should have 
tools allowing them to intervene on the structure or 
on the behavior of firms even if there is no 
competition law violation. The argument is that the 
focus of competition law enforcement is too narrow to 
deal with the situation in the digital sector. To 
intervene European competition authorities must find a 
violation such as an abuse of dominance. This is 
sometimes too complicated and it takes too long.  So 
two ideas are being floated. First, one idea would be 
to allow competition authorities to intervene in the 
digital sector, on their own initiative or at the 
request of parties, with structural or behavioral 
remedies as interim measures (i.e. before having 
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established a violation). A second idea would be to 
allow competition authorities to impose structural or 
behavioral remedies on the basis of a market 
investigation or enquiry.   
This line of reasoning is akin to a 
suggestion to give  competition authorities  
regulatory powers. 
JAMES KEYTE:  But without the predicate, as 
you said, of having to prove a violation. 
FREDERIC JENNY:  But without having to prove 
a violation, absolutely.   
This second approach is considered to have 
two advantages.  First of all, it would allow 
competition authorities to intervene earlier or faster 
than in the classical adjudicative process.  Second, 
at least with respect to the proposal to give 
competition authorities the power to impose structural 
remedies following a market investigation, this would 
allow competition authorities to intervene without 
risking being overturned by a court.  
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JAMES KEYTE:  Right.  And the disadvantages 
are probably the same ones.  [Laughter] 
FREDERIC JENNY:  That’s right.  When I say 
it has an advantage, it has an advantage from the 
point of view of competition authorities that want to 
intervene more freely. 
The clear risk of these proposals is that 
they will lead to over enforcement. 
Finally, there is a third possible option 
which is to let competition authorities intervene with 
the tools they already have and have courts review 
their decisions. 
A  perceived problem  with this third option 
is that competition law enforcement is  a slow process  
which may not be effective when applied to a type of 
activity which is very dynamic and where scope 
economies, scale economies, network effects, tipping 
effects and the power of information technology tools 
may lead to firms very rapidly acquiring entrenched 
positions which cannot be undone easily ex post. 
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Another perceived problem with this process 
is that the judges who review competition authorities’ 
decisions will need to understand highly complex and 
technical details about the economics and the dynamics  
of the digital economy, a challenge for which they may 
not be well prepared. 
Everybody has in mind the precedent of the 
credit cards payment services. Those were cases that 
in many countries were the first cases for which 
competition authorities and courts had to deal with 
competition issues on multi-sided markets. For more 
than a decade we have had contradictory competition 
authority and court decisions on how to analyze 
competition issues on such markets and many of those 
decisions and judgments revealed a poor understanding 
of what multisided markets were all about. Avoiding a 
similar long lasting level of confusion and 
contradictions in the digital sector seems to be 
advisable. So traditional competition law enforcement 
can be a very slow, very erratic, very costly process 
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when the competition issues are new in a complex 
environment such as in the digital sector. 
My own take on these issues is twofold. 
First, I believe that if competition 
authorities are given ex ante regulatory powers for 
the digital sector there will be a double risk. First, 
the risk that those powers will be extended to other 
non digital markets and, second, the risk that the 
distinction between competition law enforcement and 
regulation will be blurred, thus making competition 
law enforcement less transparent, less consistent and 
less understandable.  
Second, I think that because, first, all 
competition authorities throughout the world are faced 
simultaneously with the challenge of finding the 
appropriate way to analyze competition issues in the 
digital sector, and, second, because digital 
competition issues are transnational by nature, this 
is a perfect opportunity for competition authorities 
to cooperate and work together on the production of 
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guidelines or best practices which could serve as a 
common reference for all competition authorities 
throughout the world when they face competition issues 
in the digital sector. A joint initiative in this 
direction between the OECD, the ICN and UNCTAD with 
the help of the business and the academic communities 
would be most welcome. 
JAMES KEYTE:  That’s perfect.  
I could ask you so many more questions about 
this, but I will leave the open question:  What do you 
think will happen in Europe, in the United States, and 
in the United Kingdom with respect to this difficult 
balance and these strategies and tactics that are 
going on between the enforcement agencies, the courts, 
and even at the OECD?   
But we will have to leave that for another 
chat, perhaps next September live. 
FREDERIC JENNY:  In person. 
JAMES KEYTE:  Yes, in person. 
I thank you so much for such an interesting 
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conversation.  It is so relevant and present right 
now.  It was just fascinating.  Fred, thank you so 
much.  I’m sure everybody in the virtual ballroom 
appreciated it, and I hope to see you very soon, and 
certainly next year live. 
FREDERIC JENNY: Thank you for having me. 
